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1Reflections
The latter part of the 1990s was characterized by a sea change in social policy at the 
federal level, typically referred to as the “new federalism” or “devolution.” In a 
relatively short period of time, legislation was enacted fundamentally changing long-
standing federal programs and devolving them to states and local jurisdictions. In sum, it
essentially represents a fundamental rewriting of the American social contract for our
most vulnerable citizens. Given the magnitude of the potential changes engendered by
welfare reform and other such actions,  it has been difficult to predict the full scope of the 
potential impact on low-income communities in states such as California. One thing is
certain, however. Devolution has significantly altered the context for our grantmaking.
Over the past four years, The California Wellness Foundation has dedicated a substantial
portion of our Special Projects fund to a cluster of concerns subsumed under the general
theme of devolution.  We have pursued a fourfold grantmaking strategy: strengthening of
safety net providers; consumer education to help low-income families better understand
the changing health care system; policy analysis to inform public decisionmaking; and
advocacy efforts to help ensure that the voices of the underserved are represented in 
policy debates.  To date, we have approved more than $20 million in grants for that effort,
with the majority of these dollars funding core operating support for direct service
providers and policy organizations to maximize their ability to respond quickly and 
effectively to the challenges they confront.
To help us reflect on the myriad ways in which the state and local policy landscape is
being shaped by devolution, we commissioned Jean Ross of the California Budget Project
to develop the enclosed report.  She occupies a unique vantage point in our state that
enables her to look across systems and funding streams and observe larger patterns at
work.  We have found her analysis to be quite helpful in charting our course and thought
it might be useful to your organization as well.  Although the figures and examples 
Ms. Ross cites are from California, we trust the overall thesis of her report will also be 
relevant to those of you working in other states.
As always, we welcome your comments.
Tom David, Executive Vice President
The California Wellness Foundation
New Roles and Responsibilities: 
The Impact of Devolution on California and
CaliforniaÕs Low-Income Communities
By Jean Ross, California Budget Project
For the first time in 60 years, our nation is rewriting the social contract with its people.  This
represents a fundamental shift in responsibility from the federal level to local communities.
No longer is the federal government assuming the role of discovering problems in our society
and providing the dollars to address them, a role first taken on with the New Deal in 1936.
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A reevaluation of the fundamental role of government dominated the social policy debates of the
1990s. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
ended the federal guarantee of assistance for poor families and gave states more responsibility for
structuring programs designed to move families from welfare to work.  The 1996 welfare act is part
of a larger shift of responsibility from the federal to state and local governments, often called the
new federalism or devolution.  In some areas, most notably welfare reform, the change has been
substantial.  In other areas, including health care, change has been evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary.  After considerable debate, proposals to block grant Medicaid failed to win congressional
approval.  Health policy changes have occurred from the ground up rather than the top down
through the Medicaid waiver process and an expansion of federal support in the form of a new
block grant for states to extend health coverage to children in low-income working families. 
What have these changes meant for low-income Californians?  How has the federal role really
changed and what does this change mean for Californians?  Has devolution freed state and local
officials to experiment or does it simply mean that they are doing more with fewer resources?  As
the decade comes to a close, one of the primary objectives of devolution — balancing the federal
budget — is nearing achievement, and federal policymakers are now debating the use of anticipated
budget surpluses.  The nation’s changing fiscal fortunes present the opportunity to review what the
policy changes of the past decade have meant for low-income Californians and the programs that
serve them.  This paper is divided into five sections: a definition of devolution; an overview of the
context of recent policy changes; a review of recent policy changes; an overview of significant
upcoming policy debates; and a discussion of the implications of devolution for California. 
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DEVOLUTION DEFINED
This paper defines devolution as a shift of program and financial 
responsibility from a more to less centralized level of government.
Specifically, this paper examines the transfer of responsibility from the
federal government to the states and, within California, from the state to
county governments.  The term devolution is often used synonymously
with block grants.  This paper uses a broader definition of devolution
that includes transfers of revenues and program responsibility from a
central to decentralized level of government, program initiatives that
grant significant flexibility to states and localities, and increased 
waiver authority that allows states and localities to tailor programs and funding structures to 
meet local needs.  
The fundamental conflict in devolution, as practiced during the 1990s, is the desire on 
the part of federal officials to combine an activist policy agenda with a vision of smaller, more
decentralized government.  While devolution implies local control, many of the changes enacted
during the 1990s impose more, rather than fewer, restrictions on states’ use of federal money.
Similarly, a reduction of support as well as a transfer of responsibility has, in many instances,
accompanied devolution of responsibility.  These often contradictory motivations have under-
mined the ability of states and localities to innovate and use the flexibility implied by devolution 
to address local needs. 
THE POLICY CONTEXT 
FOR DEVOLUTION 
California is the largest and most diverse state in the nation.  With a
population in excess of 33 million and an annual budget of $78 billion,
the state’s resources exceed those of most nations.  Despite the state’s
vast resources, Californians are more likely to be poor, more likely to
receive public assistance and more likely to rely on Medicaid than are
Americans as a whole. Nearly one of five (18.8 percent) Californians
lacks U.S. citizenship, as compared to just 6.4 percent of the population
of the nation as a whole. Three trends provide a backdrop for the
recent history of devolution in California:
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Devolution is defined as shifting
program and financial responsi-
bility from the federal government
to state and local governments,
which in the 1990s has created
tension between federal restrictions
and funding reductions; and local
flexibility.
California’s policymakers faced
three major fiscal challenges in
the 1990s: the widening gap
between rich and poor, increased
demands on the budget and
restrictions on decisionmaking at
state and local levels.
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Declining incomes, growing inequality. During the early years of the 1990s, California exper-
ienced its deepest recession since the 1930s.  At 5.4 percent, California’s unemployment rate
remains higher than that for the nation as a whole (4.3 percent).  Californians are also more likely
to live in poverty, with 16.8 percent of the state’s population living in households with incomes
below the poverty threshold as compared to only 13.5 percent for the nation overall. Changes in
the state’s economic base, such as loss of defense-related jobs in the late 1980s and 1990s and the
large influx of immigrant workers, have had a lasting impact on the state’s economy.  Household
incomes were lower in 1997 than in 1989 on an inflation-adjusted basis. Over the past three
decades, the gap between California’s rich and poor has widened significantly and at a greater
rate than that for the nation as a whole. Perhaps more troubling, the rise in inequality is increas-
ingly attributable to the poor getting poorer rather than the rich getting richer.  A new report by
the Public Policy Institute of California found that inflation-adjusted incomes for male workers at
the 90th percentile increased 13 percent between 1969 and 1997, while those for male workers
at the 25th percentile fell by 40 percent. This report cites rising returns to skill — a widening of
the gap between more and less educated workers — and the overrepresentation of immigrants
among low-wage populations (immigrants make up 36 percent of the male workforce) as the 
primary reasons why California’s gap is wider than that for the nation and notes that “it appears
unlikely that the situation will correct itself through economic growth.”  These findings are of
particular significance in light of a growing body of research suggesting a correlation between
inequality and adverse health outcomes.
A decade of fiscal stress. Policymakers have confronted budget shortfalls in seven of the
past nine years.  In 1991, the unprecedented $14 billion shortfall equaled a third of the state’s
General Fund budget.  The state’s fiscal crisis of the early 1990s stemmed from a combination of
rising demand for services, particularly in recession-sensitive programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medi-Cal, and lower revenues.  In order to bridge these
gaps, policymakers reduced assistance payments for poor families and the elderly, blind, and 
disabled by more than $16 billion between 1991 and 1992 and between 1997 and 1998.
Policymakers also shifted the burden of financing education from the state to local property tax
revenues, through a set of transactions that leave cities and counties with $1.3 billion less in
annual discretionary revenues.  While the state’s fiscal situation has improved, population growth,
spending pressures, and depressed revenue growth stemming from the cumulative impact of
nearly $4 billion in annual tax reductions enacted since 1993 limit policymakers’ flexibility.
California spent more than it raised in revenues in 1998-99 and is projected to do so again in
1999-2000.  Repeated operating deficits leave the state vulnerable to the impact of further 
federal spending reductions or a downturn in the economy.  The combination of growing
demands for services, coupled with an eroding revenue base, has left the state with a structural
imbalance between revenues and expenditures, with one recent report projecting combined
state and local deficits equal to 2.8 percent of expected revenues over the next eight years.
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Fiscal decisionmaking hampered by structural constraints. California’s budget and policy-
making processes are circumscribed by a number of constraints.  Key features of the state’s fiscal
structure include constitutional provisions requiring the following: 
v Measures increasing state taxes must be approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of
the Legislature.
v Approval of the annual state budget requires a two-thirds vote of each house of the
Legislature.
v Voters must approve any increase in local taxes and any increase designated for a specific
purpose must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the voters.  
The initiative process looms large over state budget and policy debates.  Recent ballot 
measures earmark a significant fraction of the state’s revenues for popular programs and establish
policies that in turn create a demand on state resources, such as the “three strikes” sentencing 
initiative that imposes lengthy prison terms on repeat offenders.  Measures such as Proposition 98
of 1988, which guarantees schools a minimum funding level each year, and Propositions 99 and
more recently 10, which earmark new tobacco tax revenues for health care and health education
and early childhood development, respectively, limit policymakers’ ability to respond to shortfalls
and changing policy priorities.  These restrictions result in policymakers looking first (and in many
instances, exclusively) to spending reductions in the event of a budget shortfall and leave the state
ill prepared to assume the additional financial responsibilities inherent in devolution. 
Finally, Proposition 140 of 1990, which imposes term limits on state-elected officials, has
resulted in a nearly complete turnover of officeholders.  Members of the state Assembly are 
limited to three 2-year terms, while state senators can serve two 4-year terms.  The departure 
of experienced legislators has weakened the power of the Legislature, led to the departure of
many seasoned policy staff, and nearly erased the bodies’ institutional memory.  The relative 
inexperience of lawmakers hinders the Legislature’s ability to grapple with complex policy 
matters, and the short term of office has exacerbated the tendency to focus on immediate results
rather than on long-term policy implications.  At the same time, the power of vested interest
groups has grown to fill the vacuum left by the weakening of the Legislature.
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DEVOLUTION: 
WHERE WEÕVE BEEN 
Welfare Reform Shifts Financial and Program Responsibility 
to the States
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) into law. This measure fundamentally restructured the
nation’s safety net for poor families, limited legal immigrants’ access to
publicly funded benefits, and made reductions in programs designed to
assist poor families.  The PRWORA became the vehicle for two distinct
policy goals:
v Transforming the nation’s prior cash assistance program for poor families (Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) from an entitlement, whereby all who 
met basic eligibility requirements received assistance, into the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) block grant with a fixed allocation of federal funds.  
v Reducing federal spending through restrictions on legal immigrants’ eligibility for most
types of federally funded assistance and changes to other programs, including Food
Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Earned Income Tax Credit, Child
Nutrition, and Social Services Block Grant.  
The PRWORA significantly broadened states’ ability to establish the package of benefits and
services for poor families with children and instituted a focus on work by imposing lifetime limits
on assistance and requiring states to move a substantial fraction of their welfare caseloads into the
workforce.  California, in turn, gave counties increased authority to tailor local welfare programs
to local priorities and conditions, while maintaining certain statewide standards with respect to
eligibility and benefit levels.
As part of this transfer, the state gave counties a block grant of funds for services that can be
moved between employment, supportive services and child care.  In addition, the CalWORKs
law authorized incentive payments for counties that can be used for any purpose qualifying under
the federal maintenance-of-effort requirement.
The conversion of the prior entitlement into a block grant leaves states responsible for any
increase in program costs beyond the fixed federal block grant allocation.  In the short term,
states are receiving more, rather than less, federal support for TANF, due to declining caseloads
and structure of formula used to allocate federal funds.  Budgetary concerns could become more
of a factor as counties fully implement expanded employment and other support systems and, in
particular, if an economic slowdown pushes assistance rolls higher.  Moreover, the operating
assumptions used by the state’s Department of Social Services (DSS) for budget planning suggest
that the recent reforms will leave many in need of ongoing assistance.
The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996
imposed lifetime limits and other
restrictions on welfare assistance,
and left it to the states to 
determine how to support poor
families under the new rules.
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From the standpoint of devolution, it is important to note that TANF, the new federal 
welfare system, imposed a number of restrictions on states’ use of federal funds.  While states can
serve populations excluded by the federal restrictions or that otherwise differ from federal policy,
they must do so using their own resources. 
Immigrant Eligibility for Public Benefits
Motivated by a desire to bring the federal budget into balance, as well as ideological consid-
erations, the PRWORA, as initially passed by Congress, reduced federal spending by $54.5 billion
between 1997 and 2002. Over 40 percent of the measure’s initial budget reductions came from
provisions limiting the eligibility of legal immigrants for federally funded benefits.  These restric-
tions disproportionately affected California, home to over 40 percent of the nation’s immigrants.
While Congress has subsequently restored eligibility for many of those initially affected by the
PRWORA, significant restrictions with long-term fiscal implications for states remain (see table).  
California, along with a number of other states, created state-funded programs to aid many
of the immigrants who lost eligibility under federal law.  Lawmakers recently made permanent
the state-funded programs providing Food Stamps and SSI/SSP to immigrants arriving in the
United States before August 22, 1996.  By confining the harshest of the reductions to those who
arrive after the passage of welfare reform, Congress has limited the human and financial impact
of the new law.  However, as the number of immigrants who enter the United States after August
22, 1996 increases, so will the state’s financial responsibility for assistance.
The PRWORA also imposed restrictions on the receipt of public benefits by undocumented
immigrants.  In particular, the PRWORA required states to reauthorize the provision of prenatal
care to undocumented immigrants with a law passed after August 22, 1996.  As part of the 1999-
2000 budget agreement, California enacted the necessary reauthorization of prenatal services to
undocumented immigrants.
Devolution and Health Policy
In contrast to the sweeping changes in federal welfare policy, states’ role in health policy
increased incrementally.  Proposals to transform Medicaid, the nation’s health care program for
the poor, into a block grant that once appeared imminent are now absent from policy debates.
The federal role in health policy increased with the creation of the State Child Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) in 1997.  In the same measure, Congress reduced funding for the Disproportionate
Share Hospital (DSH) program, thereby forcing states to either increase spending or reduce
provider reimbursements. Key health policy shifts over the past decade include:
v Expanded waiver authority. In lieu of more fundamental reform, the federal government
expanded states’ ability to modify their Medicaid systems through the waiver process.
California used this authority to institute selective provider contracting during the early
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1980s.  During the 1990s, California obtained waivers to modify asset requirements to
expand Medi-Cal eligibility, implement the Medi-Cal managed care program, expand
ambulatory services in Los Angeles County, and to offer personal care services to elderly
and disabled persons at risk of institutionalization. 
v A move toward managed care. Approximately half (49 percent) of all Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries are now enrolled in managed care and the state anticipated reaching full
implementation for nonelderly, able-bodied enrollees by June 30, 1999. The objectives
of the Medi-Cal managed care program are twofold:  first, to reduce cost relative to the
traditional fee-for-service program and, second, to improve access to, and the quality of,
care received by Medi-Cal enrollees.  To date, there is little evidence that managed care
has succeeded at either objective.  Observers attribute the lack of cost savings to efficiency
measures previously implemented in the Medi-Cal program, especially selective contract-
ing.  On the access side, advocates report that commercial managed care providers have
failed to expand provider networks beyond the “safety net” providers that have tradition-
ally served low-income populations.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 eliminated the
need for states to seek advance federal approval to enroll most Medicaid beneficiaries in
managed care. 
v Breaking the link between welfare and Medicaid eligibility. The PRWORA broke the 
historical linkage between welfare and Medicaid eligibility and required states to provide
coverage to parents and children who would have qualified for AFDC based on state
policies in place as of July 16, 1996.  California’s new welfare law created new income 
and assets standards to ensure that everyone who qualifies for CalWORKs also qualifies
for Medi-Cal.  This change makes families who meet the expanded criteria eligible for 
Medi-Cal regardless of whether they actually receive CalWORKs benefits.  It also
ensures that families will remain eligible for Medi-Cal if they reach the time limits
imposed by state or federal welfare law or lose assistance for failure to comply with
CalWORKs or TANF requirements. 
v Support for insuring poor children. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established the
State Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP) to help states provide health coverage to
children in low-income working families.  The CHIP provides federal matching funds to
states that extend Medicaid or other health coverage to children in families with incomes
of up to 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold. In order to qualify for CHIP
funds, California established the Healthy Families Program (HFP) in 1997.  Under the
enhanced matching formula provided by the CHIP, federal funds pay approximately 
two-thirds of the cost of the HFP.  Implementation of the HFP has gotten off to a slow
start, with only 128,572 of the 328,000 potentially eligible children enrolled as of June 30,
1999.  Observers cite a number of reasons for low enrollment, including a cumbersome
application form, required premiums and copayments, and many immigrants’ fears that
enrolling in the program could harm their immigration status.  
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v Reduced support for indigent care. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 reduces
California’s 2002 Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital allotment to 81 percent of its
1995 funding level. These reductions are just now being phased in and will exacerbate an
already contentious relationship between public and private providers over the division of
DSH funds within the state. 
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998
After several years of bipartisan effort, the President signed the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) into law on August 7, 1998.  The WIA replaces the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA),
the federal training program for youth and adults.  The WIA maintains existing funding levels for
job training and was generally viewed as a much-needed reform of an excessively fragmented 
system.  The state alone operates 35 overlapping job training programs administered by 12 state
agencies. The WIA streamlines funding for a number of job training programs and allows states
to integrate planning for the use of federal funds across programs.  Federal law requires the state
to adopt a five-year Workforce Investment Plan, designate local Workforce Investment Areas,
designate local boards, and review local plans.  The state must implement the requirements of the
WIA by July 2000.
While the WIA gives priority to recipients of public services, it does nothing to ensure 
coordination between traditional employment training programs and welfare-to-work programs.
The act does establish a set of performance indicators and requires the Secretary of Labor to
negotiate the application of the indicators within each state.  This provision, along with a provision
that requires the use of Individual Training Accounts, which allow adult and dislocated worker
participants to shop among providers of training services, are intended to boost the performance
of federally supported job training programs.  Adapting to the new structure, with its emphasis 
on coordination and performance evaluation, will pose a challenge for many existing service
providers, including many nonprofits.  Programs that are unable to demonstrate a successful 
track record may find it difficult to compete under the new structure.  
California Transfers Responsibility From the State to County Governments
The state’s dire financial circumstances in 1991 prompted a rethinking of the state/county
relationship with respect to a number of health, mental health and social service programs.  
The resulting realignment of responsibilities built upon a number of years of work by counties,
program advocates, legislators and their staff.  The state achieved cost savings from realignment
by increasing counties’ responsibility for certain programs.  In turn, the state provided counties
with an equivalent amount of funding, making the transaction, at least in theory, revenue neutral
for both the state and the counties.  
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Realignment differed from a true “devolution” in that the state continued to maintain 
standards for eligibility and quality of services provided.  The intent of realignment was to move
responsibility to the counties for programs where innovation and coordination of services could
provide cost efficiencies or benefit enhancements.  While there has not been a comprehensive
evaluation or review of the effects of realignment on the availability and quality of services, most
observers believe that the programs transferred to the counties fared better under the transfer
than they would have as part of the state General Fund.  The protections offered by a dedicated
revenue source kept mental health, in particular, relatively immune from spending cuts during
the tight budget years of the early and mid-1990s.  Similarly, earmarking of revenues prevented
counties from diverting resources to other programs.
UPCOMING POLICY 
DEBATES
The balance of resources and responsibilities between the state and
localities will be a central theme in several of the major policy debates
confronting California over the next year: 
Proposition 10 will provide new funds for childrenÕs services.
Proposition 10, approved by the voters on the November 1998 ballot,
imposed a 50 cent per pack tax on tobacco products to support 
programs targeted at children up to the age of six.  The authors of
Proposition 10 give 80 percent of the moneys raised — approximately
$550 million in 1999-2000 — to new county-level Children and Families First Commissions.
The new commissions have broad authority to allocate funds to any purpose consistent with the
intent of Proposition 10.  A state commission will allocate the remaining 20 percent of the funds
for public education, research, evaluation and other purposes outlined in the initiative.  Key 
challenges related to the implementation of the new program include coordinating new and 
existing resources within the highly decentralized administrative structure established by the 
initiative; identifying and replicating “best practices”; and coordinating state and local resources 
in areas where statewide consistency is desirable or necessary.  
New revenue sources, as well as
work requirements and time 
limits enacted by welfare reform,
create the need to carefully 
consider the impact of upcoming
policy decisions on low-income
children and adults.
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Tobacco settlement offers a potential funding source for health care. California stands to
receive as much as $25 billion in payments from the national settlement reached between the
tobacco industry and state attorneys general.  The proceeds of the settlement will be divided
among the state (50 percent), counties (45 percent), and four California cities (five percent).  
While nothing in the settlement agreement dedicates the settlement payments for health care,
the state originally sued the tobacco industry to recover amounts spent by public programs to
treat tobacco-related disease and many advocates argue that the proceeds should be used for
health-related programs.  The 1999-2000 budget deposits settlement moneys into the state’s
General Fund.  A number of measures pending before the Legislature would direct some or all
of the moneys to health-related programs, and several proposals attempt to exert control over the
counties’ share of the payments. 
Community service. The next major challenge in the area of welfare reform will be the 
creation of community service programs.  The 1997 state welfare law uses community service as a
safety net for two groups of individuals: 1) those who find part-time work but earn so little as to
remain eligible for cash assistance and need additional hours of work to meet state requirements;
and 2) those who reach the state’s 18- or 24-month time limit and have sought, but fail to locate,
employment. Estimates suggest that, on average, 40,000 to 60,000 persons will be in need of
community service placements beginning in 2000-01. In implementing welfare reform, the state
made no provision for funding community service.  The current funding structure assumes that
counties will bear the cost of administering community service programs.  Many counties are still
struggling to implement the employment and support services components of CalWORKs, and it
is unclear whether counties are prepared to implement sizeable community service programs.
Key policy issues related to community service include:
v Whether sufficient community service placements will be available.
v Whether community service should be “workfare” or wage-based.  While wage-based
community service is more expensive, it allows participants to qualify for the federal
Earned Income Tax Credit and may provide a better route to unsubsidized employment.
v What steps are needed to protect against displacement of existing low wage workers by
community service participants.
v What role community-based nonprofits will play in community service.  The state welfare
law implicitly assumes a significant role for nonprofits in the operation of community service
programs but provides no mechanism for supporting community-based organizations.
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Safety net for families reaching time limits. California’s welfare law imposes an initial 
18- or 24-month time limit on assistance and conforms to the federal five-year lifetime limit on
assistance. In 2003, families will begin to reach their five-year limit on assistance.  Once a family
reaches the five-year limit, a family’s grant will be reduced by the amount attributable to the adult
in the household and the family will continue to receive a reduced aid payment based on the
number of children in the family.  For many families, this reduced amount may not be sufficient
to pay for basic needs and could put families at increased risk of homelessness or dependence
upon nonprofit safety net services.  It is too soon to estimate just how many families will reach the
five-year time limit.  In the meantime, the state’s 18- to 24-month interim limit may leave many
families without assistance.  As time limits near, a careful assessment of long-term recipients’ 
barriers to employment will be needed to determine the feasibility of moving some families from
welfare to work.  Early indications suggest that self-sufficiency will be most difficult to achieve for
those with limited English-language skills, large families, and serious substance abuse and/or




While devolution has expanded flexibility, it also has its costs.  
The two main policy motivations of devolution — decentralization 
of decisionmaking and cost cutting — pose a number of ongoing 
challenges for low- and middle-income Californians and those with 
an interest in their well-being.  
Welfare reform creates new possibilities for initiatives that assist 
the working poor. Welfare reform fundamentally shifted not only the 
programmatic focus, but also the terms of public debate around 
government’s role in providing assistance to poor families moving from welfare to work.  This, 
in turn, created a new willingness among policymakers to consider expanded public support for
low-income working families.  This shift is exemplified by the creation of the Healthy Families
Program, the success of local “living wage” campaigns, and widespread interest in child care,
health coverage, and other supports essential for working families.  
Existing monitoring and data systems are inadequate to monitor the impact of devolution.
Existing state data systems are not designed to effectively monitor the decentralization of pro-
gram design to the local level.  California is behind schedule in implementing major information
system upgrades, and existing systems are fragmented and incompatible.  Key data systems, such
By understanding the implica-
tions of devolution, community-
based organizations, advocacy
groups, foundations and govern-
ment entities can work to head
off potential problems and take
advantage of opportunities for
positive change.
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as the one used to track the progress of welfare recipients, are based on data from a limited 
number of counties.  The lack of comprehensive data collection will make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to identify approaches that show either particular potential of success or failure.  The state,
individual counties, and many independent researchers are conducting a range of studies aimed
at evaluating or monitoring the implementation of welfare reform.  While several clearinghouse
efforts are underway, there is no centralized or systematic repository of information on welfare
reform and related efforts.  Differences of scope, approach and focus will make it difficult to 
compare findings across counties, much less between California and other states. 
Responding to devolution requires enhanced capacity and multiple levels of government.
Devolution has and will continue to have a profound impact on low-income communities and the
programs that serve them.  Over a number of decades, nonprofit organizations have developed a
sophisticated policy and advocacy capacity at the national level.  The shift of policymaking from
Washington, D.C. to states and localities creates a need for a similar capacity both in Sacramento
and local communities.  Ensuring that programs are accountable and accessible to low-income
communities will require an expanded and more sophisticated understanding of the implications
of budget and policy choices, a capacity to engage in monitoring and evaluation, and an expanded
capability to engage in public policy debates at the national, state and local levels.  
Variation in local program design may create winners and losers. Counties are using the 
flexibility provided by welfare reform and other policy changes to adapt programs to meet local
priorities and resources.  California now has 58 separate CalWORKs programs that differ in
approach, work requirements and training opportunities.  Because the funding allocations for
CalWORKs are based on those used for the former GAIN program, rather than more recent
caseload data, state allocation for employment services varies among counties from $2,000 to
$7,000 per adult receiving assistance.  The CalWORKs funding structure gives counties broad
authority to move funds among administration, employment services, child care and other 
supportive services (such as substance abuse and mental health).  Variations will arise out of 
differences in approaches to service delivery, as well as the willingness of state and local elected
officials to devote resources to programs addressing the needs of low-income populations.  In the
future, location may become an important determinant of the level of assistance one receives
from public programs. 
Shifting the risk. Under the previous system, the federal and state governments shared the
cost of rising welfare caseloads or benefit increases.  Welfare reform shifts the entire burden of
increased caseloads or benefit enhancements to states and localities.  This premise has several
implications of importance to California.  First, states and localities, unlike the federal government,
are required to balance their budgets and have fewer policy tools available to provide counter-
cyclical aid in the event of an economic downturn.  Moreover, the impact of a recession on both
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revenues and demands for services is generally most pronounced on low-income communities
whose financial resources are already limited.  While the federal maintenance of effort require-
ments provide some protection against spending reductions in the CalWORKs and Medi-Cal
programs, programs for low-income families bore the largest share of the budget reductions 
during California’s repeated budget shortfalls of the early and mid-1990s.  Savings attributable 
to lower caseloads are currently sufficient to support both benefit increases and demands for 
welfare-to-work services.  In the future, state policymakers may be unwilling to maintain service
and/or benefit levels if forced to bear the entire cost out of scarce state resources.
Lead time for implementation of welfare reform minimal in terms of required systems
change. The federal and state welfare laws provided minimal lead time for program administra-
tions to implement the new systems.  California’s welfare law, enacted in August of 1997, gave
counties just five months to develop and implement plans for fundamentally restructuring county
welfare systems.  Counties are struggling to transition recipients into the new, service-rich
CalWORKs environment, while at the same time training and orienting staff to the new “work
first” philosophy of welfare reform.  Reports suggest that many counties have been slow to refer
recipients for supportive services.  Counties, for example, spent approximately a quarter of the
funds allocated for training, child care and employment-related services during the first half of 
fiscal 1998-99.
Complexity and uncertainty may discourage participation. The rapid pace of policy change
over the past several years has created confusion among both recipients and administrators of
public benefit programs.  Reports suggest that confusion is particularly prevalent among immi-
grants and their families who are unsure of their rights in light of the passage of Proposition 187,
the limits imposed by the PRWORA, and two subsequent rounds of partial restoration of federal
eligibility.  Service providers who work with immigrants report widespread concern with respect
to the issue of “public charge.” Remedying this situation will require a clarification of the public
charge issue and more effective outreach and education of persons eligible for public benefits and
those in public and nonprofit agencies who work with low-income populations.
Flexibility creates opportunities to promote access. The CHIP and Medicaid policy changes
offer states flexibility and federal matching funds that can be used to expand health coverage to
the uninsured.  To date, California has been relatively cautious in utilizing available options, 
particularly expansions of the Medi-Cal program.  Other states have used the flexibility allowed
under federal law to expand coverage by modifying income rules.  Recent federal guidance 
suggests that states can also modify family composition rules to make more two-parent families
eligible for assistance.  Policymakers may also wish to consider expanding access to the Healthy
Families Program, with or without a state subsidy, to parents of qualifying children.  
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Families may fall through the gaps. For many of the reasons mentioned above, recent 
policy changes may increase the number of families who fail to access the benefits and services 
to which they are entitled.  Relatively few families leaving CalWORKs, for example, receive 
transitional Medi-Cal benefits.  Factors contributing to low participation rates include a lack of
awareness of eligibility on the part of recipients, lack of outreach on the part of county welfare
and health services departments, and potential problems with the systems used to determine 
eligibility for assistance.
Expanded role for nonprofits. Most visions of devolution include an expanded role for the
nonprofit sector.  Whether through expanding the role for community clinics as a provider of 
outpatient care to indigents or as a provider of job retention services to CalWORKs recipients,
decentralization has and will involve a closer partnership between public and nonprofit providers
of services.  Devolution has, in many instances, increased competition for public funds and 
contracts.  Measures such as last year’s Workforce Investment Act will require nonprofits to
become more accountable to the communities they serve through the establishment of formal 
performance standards and expanded competition among providers of services.  
CONCLUSION
Devolution has, by and large, brought incremental rather than radical change to California.  
Like most forms of change, the shift of power from Washington, D.C. to Sacramento and from
Sacramento to local communities presents both challenges and opportunities. Welfare reform,
with its emphasis on employment and temporary assistance, creates an opportunity to establish a
new social contract between government and the people.  At the same time, we must ensure that
California’s most vulnerable populations are not left behind. 
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Qualified Immigrant Eligibility For Public Benefits Under Welfare Reform
PRWORA
SUBSEQUENT 
FEDERAL LAW STATE LAW INELIGIBLE Notes
Immigrants who entered the U.S. on or after
8/22/96 during their first 5 years in qualified
immigrant status who do not meet the specified
exceptions.
All immigrants ineligible except for military
veterans and their families; refugees and
asylees in their first five years in the U.S.; or
40 quarters of qualifying work in the U.S.  
In U.S. pre-8/22/96: Restored eligibility to
under 18; 65 or over as of 8/22/96; receiving
disability assistance; refugees and asylees within
first 7 years in the U.S.; certain members of the
Hmong and Lao tribes; and American Indians
born outside the U.S.  Expanded the categories
of immigrants treated like refugees and asylees.
Entered U.S. post-8/22/96: Refugees
and asylees within first 7 years in the U.S.; 40
quarters of qualifying work; veterans and their
families; certain members of the Hmong and
Lao tribes; and American Indians born outside
of the U.S. Expanded the categories of immi-
grants treated like refugees and asylees.
Eligible for state-funded  program if adult and
entered U.S. before 8/22/96 and meets specified
work requirements or a sponsored immigrant
who entered the U.S. after 8/22/96 and whose
sponsors cannot or do not provide support
under certain circumstances.  Immigrants enter-
ing the U.S. after 8/22/96 are eligible for one
year only.
Adults who do not meet state work require-
ments and immigrants who entered the U.S.
after 8/22/96 who do not qualify under the
exceptions in state or federal law. 
Entered U.S. after 8/22/96: Ineligible
for non-emergency services during their first five
years in the U.S. except for military veterans and
their families and certain refugees and asylees.
Extended eligibility for refugees and asylees to
7 years after entry to the U.S. Expanded the
categories of immigrants treated like refugees
and asylees.
Eligible for full scope services. State pays 100% of the cost of non-emergency
services for post 8/22/96 immigrants during the
five-year bar on federal assistance.
Entered U.S. after 8/22/96: Ineligible
for assistance during their first five years in the
U.S. except for military veterans and their fami-
lies and certain refugees and asylees.
Fully eligible for assistance.  Benefits provided to persons ineligible for feder-
al assistance are 100% funded out of state dol-
lars.  These expenses do, however, count toward
the federal maintenance of effort requirement.
Deeming limits the ability of many immigrants
to obtain benefits during their three or more
years in the U.S.
Ineligible except for military veterans and their
families; refugees and asylees in their first five
years in the U.S.; or 40 quarters of qualifying
work in the U.S.  
Pre-8/22/96: eligibility restored to those
receiving SSI on 8/22/96; who become disabled
subsequent to that date.
Restored eligibility for refugees and asylees with-
in first 7 years in the U.S. and for American
Indians born outside of the U.S. Expanded cate-
gories of immigrants treated like refugees and
asylees.
Pre-8/22/96: Eligible for state-funded pro-
gram if 65 or over and do not meet federal
requirements.  The state-funded Cash Assistance
Program for Immigrants (CAPI) primarily provides
benefits to those who become elderly after
8/22/96 and who are not disabled.  
Post-8/22/96: Sponsored immigrants whose
sponsors cannot or do not provide support under
certain circumstances.  Other immigrants eligible
for a one-year period (1999-2000), however an
accompanyng provision requiring five years of
deeming will limit the applicability of this provi-
sion.
Immigrants who entered the U.S. on or after
8/22/96 who do not meet the exceptions for
certain sponsored immigrants in the state CAPI
program.
The state CAPI program is scheduled to sunset
7/1/00.
Post-8/22/96 immigrants are ineligible for cover-
age during first 5 years unless family member
of a veteran or certain refugees and asylees.
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